Creditor\u27s Rights by Hartman, Paul J.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 6 
Issue 5 Issue 5 - August 1953 Article 10 
8-1953 
Creditor's Rights 
Paul J. Hartman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul J. Hartman, Creditor's Rights, 6 Vanderbilt Law Review 1049 (1953) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol6/iss5/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE AND REGISTRATION LAW:
IMPACT ON CHATTEL MORTGAGE AND PossESsoRY LIENs
In City Finance Co. v. Perry,' the Tennessee Supreme Court was
called upon to construe a portion of the new and rather involved Motor
Vehicle Title and Registration Law, which was enacted by the 1951
legislature.2 The Perry case construed the provisions which have to
do with the recordation of liens upon the certificate of title as con-
structive notice thereof. These require owners of motor vehicles to
register them in the name of the owner with the Motor Vehicle
Division of the Tennessee Department of Safety and to procure from
it a certificate of title and a title card. This certificate is delivered to
the owner if there is no lien or encumbrance appearing thereon. Other-
wise, it is delivered to the person holding the lien shown on the cer-
tificate, and it is held by such person until the lien is discharged. 3
Section 68 provides:
"No conditional sales contract, chattel mortgage, or other lien or en-
cumbrance or title retention instrument upon a registered vehicle, other
than a lien dependent upon possession entered into after the effective
date of this act shall be valid against the creditors of an owner or sub-
sequent purchasers or encumbrances [sic] until the requirements of this
article have been complied with, unless such creditor, purchaser, or en-
cumbrancer has actual notice of the prior lien."4
Section 69 (a) provides:
"Such filing and the notation of the lien or encumbrance upon the cer-
tificate of title as provided in this act shall constitute constructive notice
of all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle described therein to
creditors of the owner, to subsequent purchasers and encumbrances [sic]
except such liens as may be authorized by law dependent upon posses-
sion. . .."5
Section 69 (b)6 provides that this method of giving constructive notice
of a lien or encumbrance upon a motor vehicle shall be exclusive,
except as to liens dependent upon possession.
In the case at hand, the owner of a motor vehicle had executed a
chattel mortgage to the plaintiff, and the lien had been noted on the
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 257 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1953).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 5538.101-5538.197 (Williams Supp. 1952).
3. Id. § 5538.135 (d).
4. Id. § 5538.168.
5. Id. § 5538.169 (a).
6. Id. § 5538.169 (b).
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certificate of title and the certificate delivered to the mortgagee as pro-
vided in the Act. Thereafter, the owner took the automobile to the
garage of the defendant, who had no actual notice of the chattel
mortgage, and repairs were made. When the owner did not pay the
garage bill, defendant retained possession of the automobile so as to
preserve his common law lien. After the owner defaulted on the pay-
ment of the chattel mortgage, plaintiff instituted this replevin suit to
recover the automobile. The defendant garage owner resisted the suit
on the ground that his common law lien was superior to the chattel
mortgage lien of the plaintiff.
Defendant took the position that by reason of the provisions of sec-
tion 69 (a) of the statute the recording of the lien on the title certificate
was not constructive notice to him, since he had acquired a subsequent
common law lien. It will be noted that the notation of the lien on the
certificate of title constitutes "constructive notice of all liens and
encumbrances against the vehicle . . . to creditors of the owner, to
subsequent purchasers and encumbrances except such liens as may be
authorized by law dependent upon possession." (emphasis supplied)
However, the Court permitted the chattel mortgagee to replevy the
automobile, holding that the statute was constructive notice to de-
fendant, even though his lien was one which was dependent upon
possession. The Court reasoned, in part, that, if the defendant's argu-
ment were adopted, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to protect
his lien against subsequent common law liens of artisans, because
section 69 (b) provides that notation on the certificate of title shall
be the "exclusive" method of giving constructive notice of liens, except
as to liens dependent upon possession. In interpreting section 69 (a),
the Court construed the clause "except such liens as may be authorized
by law dependent upon possession" as an expression which refers to
notice of such possessory liens and concluded that the true meaning
of the section is obtained by transposing the exception clause to make
the section read as follows:
"[S]uch filing and the notation of the lien or encumbrance upon the cer-
tificate of title as provided in this Act shall constitute constructive notice
of all liens and encumbrances, except such liens as may be authorized by
law dependent upon possession, against the vehicle described therein to
creditors of the owner, to subsequent purchasers and encumbrances [sic]."
It supported this transposition with the view that the section would
be meaningless under any other construction, because notice is not
given to liens, but notice is given of liens.
It occurs to the writer, at the outset, that this transposed version of
the exception clause of section 69 (a) does not cure the flaw of giving
notice to liens. As the Court has the exception clause placed, it is
still giving notice of all liens "to creditors of the owner, to subsequent
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purchasers and [to] encumbrances." The fact of the matter seems to
be that there is a scrivener's error in the statute and that it should
read:
"That such filing and the notation of the lien or encumbrance upon the
certificate of title ... shall constitute constructive notice of all liens and
encumbrances against the vehicle described therein to creditors of the
owner, to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers (not encumbrances)
except such liens as may be authorized by law dependent upon pos-
session."
In short, the scrivener left the letter "r" out of "encumbrancers," thus
making the word in the statute "encumbrances." If that mistake is cor-
rected, the recordation of a lien would give notice to "encumbrancers,"
not to "encumbrances." The writer ventures to suggest that there is
a scrivener's error for two reasons. In the first place, that part of the
statute relative to giving notice "to encumbrances" is meaningless.
Notice is not given to encumbrances; it is given of encumbrances. In
the second place, the Tennessee Act likely came from the Uniform
Vehicle Code, which uses the word "encumbrancers" rather than
"encumbrances." 7
What could the Tennessee Court have done about the scrivener's
error which left the "r" out of "encumbrancers"? In interpreting a
uniform statute, such as is involved in this case, the courts are very
careful to preserve a uniform interpretation of the uniform law.8 So
important do the courts consider this principle of uniformity, when
construing a uniform statute, that they have applied the principle
to restore uniformity to a section of a uniform law which has been
mutilated by a legislature.9 While the Court did not address itself to this
problem in the case at hand, such an approach would seem entirely
applicable; the legislature's scrivener undoubtedly mutilated the law
in question. It can be assumed that, in enacting this Uniform Vehicle
Code, the Tennessee legislature intended to enact the sense of the
statute, which means that it intended to use the word "encumbrancers"
rather than the word "encumbrances." The Court quite properly could
have so interpreted the Act.'0
7. Act I, MOTOR-VEHmcLE ADMINIsTRATION REGISTRATION, CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE, AND ANTITHEFT ACT (1944). Section 65 of that Act reads thus: "(a) Such
filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title as provided in this article
shall constitute constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against the
vehicle described therein to creditors of the owner, to subsequent purchasers
and encumbrancers except such liens as may be authorized by law dependent
upon possession." It will be noticed that this section, which closely parallels
the Tennessee statute, gives notice "to creditors of the owner, to subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers," and not to "encumbrances."
8. See Note, Uniformity of Uniform Laws, 28 MARQ. L. REv. 32 (1944).
9. Castenada v. National Register Co., 43 Ariz. 119, 29 P.2d 730 (1934)
(construing the Uniform Conditional Sales Act).
10. One need look only to the Tennessee Court for support in this connection.
"It is settled in this State that the title of an Act may be looked to in aid of
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That still leaves open the question of the effect of the exception
clause, "except such liens as may be authorized by law dependent upon
possession," of section 69 (a). It is suggested that the contention of
the defendant garageman that the notation was not constructive notice
to him is not too far-fetched, even if it would make it impossible
for the holder of a chattel mortgage to protect his lien against sub-
sequent common law liens of artisans dependent upon possession.
Unfortunately, a search of authorities has not revealed any other case
construing this point.
Some support is given to the Tennessee Court's interpretation of the
exception clause by section 69 (b), which provides that this method of
recordation "shall be exclusive except as to liens dependent upon
possession." (emphasis supplied) That suggests that a lien dependent
upon possession of the motor vehicle by the garageman would be con-
structive notice to a subsequent creditor, purchaser or encumbrancer.
Also, it is somewhat doubtful if there was any intention to render it
impossible for the chattel mortgagee to protect himself against sub-
sequent common law liens dependent upon possession. For example,
a simple pledge of the automobile would defeat the chattel mortgagee's
rights if the defendant's construction of the statute were adopted. As
a practical matter, the Court pointed out that the exercise of reason-
able prudence would require the garageman to inquire about the
certificate of title when the vehicle was brought to him for repair, be-
cause he was charged with knowledge of the law. It does, however,
require some twisting of the statute to arrive at the conclusion reached
by the Court.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION AND STATUTORY RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
Procedure for Reaching Mortgagor's Equity of Redemption as an
Asset for Creditors. In Chumbley v. Carrick," the Supreme Court of
Tennessee had before it the question of the procedure by which a
mortgagor's equity of redemption can be reached by the mortgagor's
creditors. The question arose through a suit to obtain possession of
the real property and to set aside a trust deed as a cloud on plaintiff's
title. Plaintiff was the purchaser at a sheriff's sale where the equity of
redemption of the encumbered land was sold under an execution at law
in favor of a judgment creditor. At the time of the levy of execution
and at the time of the sale to plaintiff, the property was encumbered
by a properly recorded trust deed from defendant, Carrick, and his
wife to Casey, as trustee, to secure the payment of a note. Subsequent
the construction of the body, Southern Ry. Co. v. Rowland, 152 Tenn. 243, 276
S.W. 638, and to effectuate the legislative intent words may be modified, al-
tered or supplied. Hudgins v. Nashville Bridge Co., 172 Tenn. 580, 113 S.W.2d
738; Scales v. State, 181 Tenn. 440, 181 S.W.2d 621." Churchwell v. Callens, 252
S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
11. 254 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. 1953).
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to the sale, this deed of trust was released, but the Carricks later made
another trust deed to Shields, as trustee, to secure another indebtedness
for money borrowed. Plaintiff sued to obtain possession of the land
and to set aside the trust deed to Shields as a cloud on the title which
he claims by reason of the deed made to him at the sheriff's sale. The
Court held that the execution and sale to plaintiff were void on the
ground that Carrick's equitable interest in the real estate - his equity
of redemption - could not be levied on by execution at law. Since
the execution and sale were void, reasoned the Court, the execution
sale gave plaintiff no interest which would ripen to his benefit upon
the discharge of the first trust deed.
A mortgagor's equity of redemption constitutes an asset for credi-
tors.12 However, the method of reaching this asset presents another
problem. It seems rather well settled that, in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, an execution at law operates only on legal rights and
titles, not on equitable interests in the sense that the equitable interest
could be subjected to levy and sale under a writ of execution issued
against the debtor.'3 The reason for the rule seems purely historical,
with very little by way of a pragmatic or useful basis. On the other
hand, equitable interests can be reached as assets in a court of equity.14
Whether Carrick had an interest which could be reached by levying an
execution at law seems to depend upon whether Tennessee has a "lien"
or a "title" theory of mortgages. If a "lien" theory, the creditor may
levy upon the mortgagor's interest and sell the land subject to the
mortgage, because the mortgagor's interest is legal, but if the "title"
theory obtains, the equity of redemption can be reached only through
a court of equity under a judgment creditor's bill or a similar equitable
remedy.'5
Tennessee still adheres to much of the basic common law notion that
the mortgage vests the mortgagee with the legal title to the land.'6
However, Tennessee is really a hybrid sort of a state in this respect,
and in certain respects it follows doctrines that are inherent only in
the "lien" theory of mortgages.Y7 Does the fact that the security device
12. 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 37.1 (1943).
13. Franklin Savings & Loan Corp. v. Snapp, 179 Tenn. 151, 154, 163 S.W.2d
332, 333 (1942) ; see 21 Am. Jua., Executions § 425 (1939) and cases there cited.
In certain instances, however, equitable title can be reached through an execu-
tion at law. If the holder of the equitable title is entitled to the legal title
also, the equitable interest can be reached by an execution at law. Smitheal v.
Gray, 20 Tenn. 491 (1840); see CARUTTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 477 (7th
ed., Gilreath, 1951).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10352 (Williams 1934); CARUTaERS, HISTORY OF A
LAwSuiT § 477 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951).
15. 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 37.1 (1943).
16. See Howell v. Tomlinson, 33 Tenn. App. 1, 9, 228 S.W.2d 112, 115 (M.S.
1950).
17. Thus, Tennessee follows the lien theory measure of damages in a suit
by the mortgagee. Before he can recover damages for the impairment of his
security, he must show that the injury reduced the value of the remaining
1953 ] 1053
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in the case at hand was a deed of trust rather than a mortgage make
any difference as to the passage of title out of the debtor who gave
the security? While pointing out that there is some authority to the ef-
fect that either a mortgage or a deed of trust passes title, a leading au-
thority has declared that the general rule is that the trustee under a
deed of trust acquires no title or estate in the land but is a mere agent
for both parties, invested, however, with a power of sale in case of de-
fault, which, when properly exercised, will pass to the purchaser all
the debtor's title and interest together with the mortgagee's right with
respect to the security.18 Tennessee, however, does not go along with
the general rule. Instead, she seems to take the view that title does
pass to the trustee.19 Therefore, in Tennessee, mortgages and deeds
of trust indifferently pass the legal title out of the debtor so that he
retains only an equitable interest which cannot be levied on by ex-
ecution at law.
20
Since the levy and sale in the case at hand were void, what rights,
if any, could the purchaser at execution sale acquire in the property
when the trust deed in force at that time was subsequently discharged
and there was a period of time before the execution of the second trust
deed during which the property was free from encumbrances by way
of deeds of trust? While there is somewhat of a paucity of authority
on the subject, what little authority there is seems to hold that the
purchaser at an execution sale, which is void for the reason that an
equitable interest was levied on, gets nothing. The whole matter is
a nullity.21 In Tennessee, moreover, the purchaser at an execution
sale is not a bona fide purchaser for value; he buys at his peril.22
While the result reached in the case at hand is perhaps in line with
authority, it is rather harsh on the plaintiff if it is too late to resort
to any other remedy. This is particularly true because there is some
doubt that the creditor under the second deed of trust is entitled to
the preferred position of a bona fide purchaser for value.23 This case,
mortgaged property below the amount of the debt secured. Lieberman, Love-
man & Cohn v. E. C. Knight, 153 Tenn. 268, 283 S.W. 450 (1925). In a strict
title state, the mortgagee may recover the full value of damages done to the
property, notwithstanding the security for his debt is still ample. Byrom v.
Chapin, 113 Mass. 308 (1873). For a discussion of the measure of damages
under both theories, see OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES § 128 (1951).
18. 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 20 (1943).
19. Johnson v. Roland, 61 Tenn. 203 (1872).
20. Johnson v. Roland, 61 Tenn. 203 (1872); Wilkins v. Johnson, 54 S.W.
1001 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899); CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 477 (7th ed.,
Gilreath, 1951); GIsSON, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 882 (4th ed., Higgins & Crown-
over, 1937); cf. Franklin Savings & Loan Corp. v. Snapp, 179 Tenn. 151, 163
S.W.2d -332 (1942) (purchaser's equitable interest under a conditional sales
contract held not liable to execution at law).
21. Keith v. Leath, 1 Tenn. Cas. 430 (1875); Wilkins v. Johnson, 54 S.W.
1001 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1899); Maynard v. Thompson, 193 Ky. 130, 234 S.W. 959
(1921).
22. Evans v. Belmont Land Co., 92 Tenn. 348, 21 S.W. 670 (1893).
23. See Smitheal v. Gray, 20 Tenn. 491 (1840) (case silent as to any claim
that he was such; execution proceedings may have been notice).
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therefore, lends support to the point already made that the reason
for refusing to permit a creditor to levy on an equitable interest is
historical, with but little by way of a useful purpose to support it.
This appears to be especially so because the creditor could reach the
equitable interest by a suit in equity.
Scope of Statutory Right of Redemption of Land Sold to Satisfy
Judgment. In the related cases of Fite v. Jennings24 and Fite v. Wood, 5
the Supreme Court of Tennessee had before it the question whether a
junior judgment creditor can reach land sold under a senior judgment
creditor's execution after the judgment debtor's statutory right of re-
demption has been exercised by a purchaser of the land from the
judgment debtor. Rhodes obtained a judgment against his debtor,
Jennings, an execution was levied on land owned by the debtor and
the land was sold to Rhodes at a sheriff's sale, but no deed was made
at that time. After the Rhodes judgment, but before the Rhodes
execution sale, Fite also obtained a judgment against Jennings. Five
days-after Rhodes had purchased at the execution sale, Jennings sold
and conveyed his interest in the land to Wood, who promptly recorded
her deed. Wood then exercised the judgment debtor's right of redemp-
tion, which had been assigned to her along with the conveyance.26
Wood paid the purchaser at the execution sale, Rhodes, the amount
which he had paid for the land, with interest and expenses. About five
weeks later, Fite, the second judgment creditor, filed a suit in equity
and he also had an attachment issued and levied on whatever interest
Jennings had in the land. This proceeding was based on the theory
that the Fite judgment was a lien on the land. Fite later filed a sup-
plemental bill alleging that, since his judgment was a lien on Jennings'
interest at the time Wood purchased from Jennings, the deed to Wood
should be declared fraudulent, null and void (Fite v. Jennings). Fite
lost his case, the Court reasoning that he had no lien on Jennings'
interest in the land at the time of the conveyance to Wood or at the
time when Wood redeemed from Rhodes. The Court said that Fite's
judgment would not attach to Jennings' naked legal title and his equity
of redemption.
At the outset, the writer ventures to suggest that it is more consonant
with legal principles and may avoid trouble in other cases, to des-
ignate Jennings' right of redemption a statutory right of redemption
rather than an equity of redemption. Strictly speaking, equity of re-
demption, which lies only at the heart of mortgage law, is a mortgagor's
24. 193 Tenn. 250, 246 S.W.2d 1 (1952).
25. 250 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. 1952).
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7738 (Williams 1934), which authorizes the judgment
debtor to redeem, was held to allow redemption by the assignee of the debtor.
See also TEmN. CODE ANN. § 7736 (Williams Supp. 1952) and annotations to




interest in his property before that right has been cut off by fore-
closure and thereby destroyed for all purposes. The statutory right
of redemption, which is involved in the case at hand, springs into
existence immediately upon perfection of the foreclosure process; it
is a new right which a statute confers upon the debtor. In short, the
statutory right of redemption has nothing to do with the equity of
redemption.27 In a proper case, it would be of importance to observe
this distinction, because it makes a vital difference whether it is a
mortgagor's true equity of redemption or a statutory right of redemp-
tion which a creditor is seeking to reach as an asset. While a mort-
gagor's equity of redemption is an asset for creditors, it is generally
held that a debtor's statutory right of redemption is immune to at-
tachment, execution or equitable levy under a judgment creditor's
suit.28
After the debtor's land has been sold under an execution, apparently
the only right left to an unsatisfied junior lienor, such as Fite, is to
exercise whatever right of statutory redemption is available to him.
Therefore, in its conclusion that a lien will not attach to the debtor's
(statutory) right of redemption, the Court is in accord with the general
view. There is very considerable doubt, however, as to the extent to
which this doctrine is applicable to the rights of Fite. To support its
conclusion that Fite's judgment would not attach as a lien, the Court
expressly said that, while Jennings had naked legal title, the equitable
title was in the purchaser of the land at the sheriff's sale. Those are
not quite the facts, however. Fite had gotten his judgment before the
execution sale, and at that instant his judgment became a lien.
2 9
Therefore, when Fite's judgment was rendered, with the accompanying
lien on the real estate of the debtor, the equitable title was not in the
purchaser at the execution sale; both the equitable and legal title
were still in the debtor. The Court relied on Huffaker v. Bowman3°
to sustain its position that Fite's judgment did not attach to the
debtor's interest. The Huffaker case will not support such a decision.
It merely held that the lien of a judgment will not attach to a naked
legal title when equitable title is in another. However, there was a
27. See 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 237 (1943); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 8 (1951).
28. Ewing v. Cook, 85 Tenn. 332, 3 S.W. 507 (1887); see Pellston Planing Mill
& Lumber Co. v. Van Wormer, 198 Mich. 648, 165 N.W. 724, 726 (1917). As to
the application of this doctrine where there is a statutory right of redemption
after a mortgage foreclosure by a senior lienor, see Powers v. Andrews, 84
Ala. 289, 4 So. 263 (1888); Sayre v. Vander Voort, 200 Iowa 990, 205 N.W. 760
(1925); Higgs v. McDuffee, 81 Ore. 256, 158 Pac. 953 (1916). The mortgagor's
equity of redemption clearly can be reached as an asset. See 1 GLENN, MoRT-
GAGES § 37.1 (1943). But the creditor may encounter trouble as to the method
by which it is reached. For a discussion of that point, see the treatment of
Chumbley v. Carrick, 254 S.W.2d 732 (1953), in the preceding subsection of
this section.
29. Shepard v. Lanier, 192 Tenn. 608, 241 S.W.2d 587 (1951).
30. 36 Tenn. 89 (1856).
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union of both legal and equitable title in the debtor when Fite's lien
came into existence. Huffaker did not purport to say that the sheriff's
sale would wash out and nullify the prior judgment lien of Fite,
and so the case is not authority for the conclusion that there was
nothing to which Fite's lien could attach. If junior liens could
be shaken off so easily, as the Court in the present case by impli-
cation seemed to hold they can, such liens would be worth very little.
A foreclosure of a senior lien would effectively sabotage all of the
rights of a junior lienor. As will be seen presently, the Court may
have reached a correct result by deciding against Fite, but the ap-
proach used seems to contain a flaw.
Whether the decision reached is correct depends upon the nature
of the suit brought by Fite. It is not possible from the opinion to
determine whether it might have been possible to treat Fite's suit as
one to redeem from the purchaser at the execution sale. If it could
have been treated as such an action, he should have been permitted
to redeem. That Fite did have a right to redeem from the execution
sale purchaser is clear.31 Even where a senior lienor has foreclosed his
lien by legal proceedings, making the junior lienor a party to the
proceedings, the junior lienor may make a timely redemption. 32 Fite
apparently was -not even a party to any foreclosure proceedings. Also,
had the debtor redeemed from the purchaser at the execution sale,
as he could have,33 the property would have come back to the debtor
subject to the lien of Fite's judgment. The debtor, by redemption,
would have, in effect, bought back property of which he had been
divested by the sheriff's sale and thus would have brought it again
into a position where it could be subjected to the payment of the
junior lienor's judgment against him much the same as could any
other property acquired by the debtor.34 But does the junior lienor
have the same rights when the debtor's grantee redeems the property
from the execution sale purchaser? That was the point in the second
instant case of Fite v. Wood, where Fite undertook to redeem from
Wood, who had purchased the land in question from the debtor,
Jennings.
In Fite v. Jennings, the first of the two cases in point of time, the
Court expressed the view that Fite could still redeem from Wood.
This expression of opinion was followed by Fite's action involved in
the case of Fite v. Wood, in which he sought to redeem as a subsequent
judgment creditor of Wood's vendor, Jennings. Despite their dictum
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7740 (Williams 1934).
32. See Cooper v. Maurer, 122 Iowa 321, 98 N.W. 124, 125 (1904).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7738 (Williams 1934).
34. See Anderson v. Renshaw, 229 Iowa 93, 294 N.W. 274, 278 (1940); Cooper
v. Maurer, 122 Iowa 321, 98 N.W. 124, 126 (1904); 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 234




in Fite v. Jennings that Fite could redeem from Wood, the Court held
in Fite v. Wood that Fite could not redeem. The Court predicted its
holding squarely on the interpretation of the Tennessee statutes author-
izing redemption of land after an execution sale. Wood had proceeded
as the grantee of the judgment debtor, Jennings, to exercise the right
of redemption given to Jennings as such debtor by virtue of the Ten-
nessee statute.3 Under another Tennessee statute, a bona fide creditor
can redeem the land sold at a sheriff's sale, but he must hold it subject
to redemption by any other such creditor of the judgment debtor.3 But
redemption by a judgment debtor (or his vendee-assignee) of land sold
at an execution sale is not necessarily the same as redemption by a
judgment creditor. The statutory provision for redemption by the judg-
ment debtor does not say that the debtor holds the land subject to the
right of a bona fide creditor to redeem from him.37 Therefore, the Court
concluded, a redeeming judgment debtor does not hold his redeemed
land subject to further redemption by a bona fide creditor. Since Wood
was the purchaser of the land from the judgment debtor, the Court
felt that a creditor's redemptive rights against her were no greater
than his redemptive rights against the judgment debtor and that,
therefore, she did not hold the land subject to further redemption by
a bona fide creditor.38
The decision that Fite could not redeem from Wood is perhaps in line
with the ordinary practice in such matters.3 9 If the property is more
than sufficient to pay the senior lienor's debt, the junior lienor can
protect himself either by bidding at the sale or by exercising his right
of redemption from the purchaser at the execution sale or from any
creditor who may hold the land, or in the instant situation, as has
been shown, if the debtor redeemed, the land would have been subject
to Fite's lien. However, the debtor's grantee who redeems does not
stand in the debtor's shoes; hence, the liens which the debtor has
created are not those of the redeeming grantee.40 Therefore, the
junior lienor cannot redeem from the grantee of the debtor. Of course,
the sale by the debtor must be bona fide and for a substantial con-
sideration, else the creditor is defrauded by the conveyance to the
redeeming grantee and he can lay hold of the land as redeemed by
the grantee.41
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7738 (Williams 1934).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7740 (Williams 1934).
37. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7738 (Williams 1934).
38. See Reaves v. Bank of Hartsville, 64 S.W. 307 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900),
which gave the quietus to Carden v. Spilman, 1 Tenn. Cas. 10 (1847), although
making no mention of the Carden case.
39. Barry v. Harnesberger, 148 Fed. 346 (7th Cir. 1906); Cooper v. Maurer,
122 Iowa 321, 98 N.W. 124 (1904); see Note, Redemption from Judicial Sales,
5 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 625, 633 (1938).
40. See 2 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 234 (1943).




Claims Barred by Bankruptcy Discharge
A discharge in bankruptcy is a defense to certain types of liabilities
and has no effect upon others. The discharge releases the bankrupt
from all of his provable debts2 which were duly scheduled in time for
proof and allowance or which were held by creditors with notice or
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings, with certain ex-
ceptions. One of the exceptions is a claim against the bankrupt for
willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.
43
The discharge which the bankrupt receives in bankruptcy proceed-
ings does not enumerate the debts which are thereby released, but is
couched in the general language of "all of his debts which are prov-
able in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by this title."" A
question often arises as to what court determines whether a par-
ticular claim is released by a discharge, since the certificate of dis-
charge is silent as to the claims affected.45 The general rule is that the
bankruptcy court merely determines the right to a discharge, but it
does not, except under unusual circumstances, determine the effect
of the discharge.46 Whether a particular claim has been released by a
discharge normally is decided when the question actually arises; and
usually that happens when suit is brought upon the claim. The logical
process which then takes place corresponds precisely to the forms of
42. Not all claims against the bankrupt are provable in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, and any claim that is not provable is not affected by a discharge. See 1
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.03 (14th ed. 1940, Supp. 1952). The claims which are
provable are set forth in § 63 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 103 (Supp. 1952). Thus, a tort claim not reduced to
judgment before the bankruptcy petition is filed is not provable unless it is
a negligence claim where the action has been started against the bankrupt
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and is still pending at the time of
the petition or unless the tort can be waived and the claim proved in contract.
An otherwise nonprovable tort claim which has been reduced to judgment be-
fore the petition is filed is provable. Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U.S. 467, 45 Sup.
Ct. 357, 69 L. Ed. 739 (1925).
43. Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C.A. § 32 (1953), authorizes a general discharge, while § 17a of the Act,
30 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1953), expressly reserves
from the operation of the discharge debts not affected by the discharge and
lists several types of claims that are not affected by the'discharge. Among the
claims not released are those for willful and malicious injuries to persons and
property.
44. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 1(15), 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1(15) (Supp. 1952); BANKRUPTCY ACT § 17a, 30 STAT. 550 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1953); see Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 39, 202
S.W.2d 664, 665 (1947); 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3439 (5th ed. 1939).
45. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.28 (14th ed. 1940).
46. See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.28 (14th ed. 1940, Supp. 1952). For
treatment of the unusual circumstances under which the bankruptcy court
will determine whether a debt is dischargeable, see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 54 Sup. Ct. 695, 78 L. Ed. 1230 (1934); Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129
F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942); Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946);
Csatari v. General Finance Corp., 173 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949); Glenn, Effect




common law procedure. Suit upon the claim having been instituted,
the defendant-bankrupt sets up his discharge in bankruptcy as a de-
fense. The question at bar then is simply whether the particular debt
is of the class that was released by the discharge; to try that issue does
not involve any attack upon the efficacy of the discharge. Where a
judgment had been rendered against the bankrupt before the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, the parties may come to grips on the issue of
dischargeability of the claim when the claimant, after the bankruptcy
discharge and in proceedings supplementary to the claimant's judg-
ment, seeks to reach some asset of the bankrupt to satisfy the claim.47
Dischargeability of Automobile Accident Claims. In Seward v.
Gatlin,48 the Supreme Court of Tennessee was presented with the
problem of the dischargeability of a claim allegedly stemming from a
willful and malicious injury to the person and property of the ag-
grieved claimant, a nondischargeable claim. The judgment on which
the claim was based grew out of an automobile collision caused by
bankrupt in which plaintiff was injured. It was rendered on a declara-
tion containing three counts. The first count charged that "the de-
fendant [bankrupt], acting wilfully, deliberately and wantonly was
operating his automobile in a grossly negligent and reckless manner
and while so operating his automobile he caused it to crash headlong
into and upon the plaintiff's automobile." (emphasis supplied) The
second count set out the Tennessee statute prohibiting the operation of
an automobile on the left of the center of the highway and charged
"that the defendant in total disregard for the safety of the plaintiff
and his property, recklessly, wantonly and negligently drove his auto-
mobile upon the left of the center of the highway into the face of on-
coming traffic and directly into and against the plaintiff's automobile."
(emphasis supplied) The third count charged that defendant was
driving his automobile while under the influence of intoxicants so that
he was unable properly to control his car. The plaintiff won a verdict
and a judgment, which included $5,000 punitive damages. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court held that the record of the tort case did not show
willfulness and malibiousness, both of which are necessary to prevent
a discharge in bankruptcy.
The burden of showing that a claim is not released by the dis-
charge which the bankrupt has received is upon the claimant resisting
47. E.g., Marbry v. Cain, 180 Tenn. 500, 176 S.W.2d 813 (1944), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 800 (1944), where, after bankrupt had been discharged, claimant in-
stituted proceedings to garnishee insurance money due bankrupt. The same
pattern was followed in Fleshman v. Trolinger, 18 Tenn. App. 208, 74 S.W.2d
1069 (E.S. 1934), and Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664
(1947). Or the bankrupt may raise the issue in a suit to enjoin a garnishment
or execution by the creditor. In re Ellman, 48 F. Supp. 518 (W.D.N.Y. 1942);
Bell Mfg. Co. v. Cross, 123 S.C. 507, 117 S.E. 196 (1923).
48. 193 Tenn. 299, 246 S.W.2d 21 (1952).
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the discharge.49 Whether the wrong on which a judgment was based
was willful and malicious within that provision of the Bankruptcy
Act which excepts such a claim from the effect of a discharge is de-
termined by the record of the case in which the judgment was re-
covered.50 In the well-recognized work Remington on Bankruptcy,
it is pointed out that, "[fin determining the character of the debt, the
allegations of the complaint or declaration are to be considered, the
instructions of the court in submitting the case to the jury, the verdict
of the jury and the judgment of the court; and the allegations of the
pleading must charge clearly that the acts were done intentionally."51
Where the judgment is general in its terms, and thus not determina-
tive of the question whether the injury was willful and malidious,
the court may look behind the judgment in order to determine
whether the claim upon which it was founded was of such nature
that it was not released by the discharge.52 For such purpose, it is
proper to examine the entire record of the proceeding in which the
judgment was rendered.
53
While a claim based on negligence - in many states, including Ten-
nessee, even gross negligence - does not constitute such a willful and
malicious injury as to be nondischargeable, 4 the line between "willful
49. Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 43 Sup. Ct. 219, 67 L. Ed. 419 (1923); Peerson
v. Mitchell, 205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028 (1950), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 866
(1951).
50. See In re Burchfield, 31 F.2d 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1929); Randolph v. Edmonds,
185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947); 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17 (14th ed.
1940, Supp. 1952).
51. 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 812 (5th ed. 1939).
52. McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N.W.2d 153 (1949); Campbell v. Nor-
gart, 73 N.D. 297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944); Ex parte Cote, 93 Vt. 10, 106 Atl. 519
(1918).
53. In re Greene, 87 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937); Barbery v. Cohen, 183 App.
Div. 424, 170 N.Y. Supp. 762 (1st Dep't 1918); Campbell v. Norgart, 73 N.D.
297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944). The pleadings, of course, are not necessarily con-
clusive. Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N.J.L. 177, 17 A.2d 609 (1941); Doty v.
Rogers, 213 S.C. 361, 49 S.E.2d 594 (1948). Evidence introduced at the trial
of the original cause ordinarily may not be resorted to as part of the record to
determine whether conduct was willful and malicious. Peerson v. Mitchell,
205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 866 (1951). For a
case where the court did look to the testimony, see In re Ellman, 48 F. Supp.
518 (W.D.N.Y. 1942). Nor can the parties go outside the record. In re Danahy,
45 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
54. See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17 (14th ed. 1940). A very substantial
number of states hold that an injury is dischargeable however great the degree
of negligence. E.g., In re Wegner, 88 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1937) (wanton and
reckless conduct charged); In re Ellman, 48 F. Supp. 518 (W.D.N.Y. 1942)
(culpable and willful negligence); In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ga.
1936) (dischargeable however great the negligence); Rogers v. Doody, 119
Conn. 532, 178 Atl. 51 (1935) (injuries resulting from reckless disregard of
rights of others); Prater v. King, 73 Ga. App. 393, 37 S.E.2d 155 (1946) (dis-
chargeable however great the negligence). This seems to be the Tennessee
view. In addition to the Seward case, see Mabry v. Cain, 180 Tenn. 500, 176
S.W.2d 813 (1944). Some writers think that the majority of courts adhere to
the theory that negligence, however gross, cannot produce nondischargeable
willful and malicious injury. See NADLER, BANKRUPTCY § 786 (1948); Laugharn,
Can Automobile Accident Judgments Be Discharged in Bankruptcy? 20 J.N.A.
REF. BANKR. 110, 111 (1946).
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and malicious" action on the one hand and negligence on the other
is considerably blurred. The well-spring for the view that negligence
is not tantamount to "willful and malicious" conduct is a dictum in
the 1904 United States Supreme Court case of Tinker v. Colwell,55 in
which Justice Peckham declared that "[o]ne who negligently drives
through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an in-
dividual would not, as we suppose," commit a nondischargeable act.
Since the date of that utterance, there has been a plethora of cases
on the subject of what is a "willful and malicious" injury. 6 In order
that a discharge be denied, the injury must be both willful and ma-
licious, 57 but an injury may be both willful and malicious within the
provisions denying effect to a discharge without there being personal
hatred, spite or ill will.58 The Tinker opinion undertook to give addi-
tional guidance for determining the purview of "willful and malicious"
conduct. The Court said, in part:
"In order to come within the meaning as a judgment for a willful and
malicious injury to person or property, it is not necessary that the cause
of action be based upon special malice, so that without it the action could
not be maintained.59
"[A] willful disregard of what one knows as his duty, an act which is
against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily
causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully
and maliciously."60
It was not a long step from this test to the conclusion that "willful
and wanton" conduct is sufficient to constitute willful and malicious
injury to persons and property;6 ' the latter view has carried over into
the field of litigation involving liabilities resulting from injuries in-
flicted by motorists, which has been a prolific source of litigation re-
volving around the dischargeability of the claim of an aggrieved
55. 193 U.S. 473, 489, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. Ed. 754 (1904). This case actually
involved the dischargeability of a judgment for criminal conversation. The
justice must have been thinking about the negligent operation of a horse and
buggy rather than the present-day automobile with its potentialities for
destruction.
56. See 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17 (14th ed. 1940).
57. Ibid.
58. In re Greene, 87 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937); Matter of Halper, 82 Misc. 205,
143 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (N.Y. City Ct. 1913); see 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.17
(14th ed. 1940).
59. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 485, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. Ed. 754 (1904).
60. 193 U.S. at 487.
61. McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, 242 U.S. 138, 37 Sup. Ct. 38, 61 L. Ed. 205 (1916)
(unexcused and wanton conversion); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Fant, 181 Tenn.
492, 181 S.W.2d 753 (1944) (conversion by way of theft); Peerson v. Mitchell,
205 Okla. 530, 239 P.2d 1028 (1950) (malice and willfulness inherent in a
judgment for knowingly harboring a vicious dog); see 7 REMINGTON, BANK-
RUPTCY § 3551 (5th ed. 1939, Supp. 1952). However, an "innocent and technical"
conversion is not willful and wanton. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S.
328, 55 Sup. Ct. 151, 79 L. Ed. 393 (1934); Woelfle v. Giles, 182 Tenn. 88, 184
S.W.2d 177 (1945).
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party.62 There is much authority, too, for denying a discharge where
the bankrupt-motorist is guilty of various degrees of recklessness.
63
And where the judgment contains an award of punitive damages, there
is good authority for the proposition that it is not dischargeable.6 4 Very
respectable authority has held that a judgment for punitive damages
against the bankrupt because of "wanton and reckless" conduct is con-
clusive evidence of every element of "willful and malicious" conduct.
6 5
An examination of the Seward case indicates a liberality of attitude
toward the bankrupt on the matter of a discharge of the claim against
him. The Court went far in extending the bar of the discharge to a
claim alleged to be "willful and malicious." Although the tort declara-
tion alleged that the bankrupt "willfully," "wantonly," "recklessly"
and "deliberately" injured the claimant, while the bankrupt was under
the influence of intoxicants, and the claimant was awarded punitive
damages, nevertheless the Court was not satisfied that the injury was
willful and malicious.66 The Court pointed out that there was nothing
in the tort judgment against the bankrupt to indicate willfulness and
maliciousness. Neither, apparently, was there anything to negative
these two requirements, both of which, according to much excel-
lent authority, are well pleaded when, as in the Seward case, the dec-
laration charges that the bankrupt "willfully, wantonly, deliberately
and recklessly" injured the claimant. 67 Moreover, the claimant's ver-
62. See NADLER, BANKRUPTCY § 786 (1948).
63. Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946) (default judgment for
punitive damages for injuries caused where motorist in wanton and reckless
disregard of the safety of others was driving truck on wrong side of road
while intoxicated); In re Greene, 87 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1937) (excessive and
dangerous rate of speed, running stop signal); In re Dutkiewicz, 27 F.2d 334
(W.D.N.Y. 1928) (complaint alleged that defendant negligently, carelessly
and wantonly drove his auto head on against claimant on wrong side of road);
Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App.2d 127, 177 P.2d 364 (1947) (default judg-
ment where complainant merely pleaded grossly negligent and reckless con-
duct); Breitowich v. Standard Process Corp., 323 Ill. App. 261, 55 N.E.2d 392
(1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 801 (1945) (red-light crashing); Reell v. Central
Illinois Elec. & Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N.E.2d 500 (1942) (declaration
charged that bankrupt recklessly, willfully and wantonly operated automo-
bile); Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So.2d 141 (La. App. 1950) (motorist drunk);
McClure v. Steele, 326 Mich. 286, 40 N.W.2d 153 (1949) (declaration charged
negligence that was willful, wanton, gross and malicious); Greenfield v. Tu-
cillo, 265 App. Div. 343, 38 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep't 1942) (running red light,
speeding, guilty of criminal negligence); Margulies v. Garwood, 178 Misc. 970,
36 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (driving on wrong side of highway, speeding,
guilty of reckless driving); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S.C. 361, 49 S.E.2d 594 (1948)
(driving on wrong side of highway at excessive speed while intoxicated and
colliding at crest of hill); Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N.W.2d 417 (1944)
(operating automobile in a drunken condition in a reckless, willful and wan-
ton disregard of the safety of others).
64. Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946); 7 REMINGTON, BANK-
RUPTCY 814 (5th ed. 1939). Contra: Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202
S.W.2d 664 (1947).
65. Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946). Contra: Randolph v.
Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947).
66. Cf. Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947) (dis-
charge granted although judgment included punitive damages).
67. See note 63 supra.
1953 ] 1063
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
dict and judgment against the bankrupt included $5,000 for punitive
damages, and, as already noted, there is good authority that an award
of punitive damages is conclusive of every element of a "willful and
malicious" injury.68 However, the Tennessee Court explained away
the effect of punitive damages on the ground that such damages may
be awarded for gross negligence, of which malice is not a necessary
element.69 The Court then presumably inferred that the Seward
verdict and judgment could have been predicated on gross negligence, 70
which, of course, is enough for "willfulness and maliciousness" in a
good many states.71 Further, there is good authority which holds
that, when the creditor's declaration contains several counts, some
based on malice and others on negligence only, and the verdict is
general - which was the situation in the case at hand - the pre-
sumption is that the verdict was based upon the cause of action in-
volving malice.72
Automobiles have become vehicles of terror and destruction when
in the hands of a drunken speed maniac. One might well inquire, as
did a Louisiana court, whether the Bankruptcy Act was ever in-
tended to shield such persons from the consequences of their in-
difference and utter disregard for the safety of others.7 3 The purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act, as stated by the most authoritative tribunal
in the land on that subject, is "to relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free
from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes."74 In some respects the Seward decision is not completely
impeccable.
Dischargeability of Unscheduled Claims. The Tennessee Supreme
Court case of Ingramn v. Carruthers75 also involved the question of
whether a discharge in bankruptcy released a particular debt. A
bankruptcy discharge will not release debts that "have not been duly
scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the
creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or
actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy. ' 76 Discharge of a
given debt thus requires either the proper and timely scheduling of the
debt, though the creditor had neither notice nor actual knowledge of
68. See note 64 supra.
69. Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947).
70. Cf. Randolph v. Edmonds, 185 Tenn. 37, 202 S.W.2d 664 (1947).
71. See note 63 supra.
72. Buck v. Alex, 350 Ill. 167, 182 N.E. 794 (1932); Reell v. Central Illinois
Elec. & Gas Co., 317 Ill. App. 106, 45 N.E.2d 500 (1942). Contra: In re DeLauro,
1 F. Supp. 678 (D. Conn. 1932); Freedman v. Cooper, 126 N.J.L. 177, 17 A.2d 609
(1941).
73. Rosen v. Shingleur, 47 So.2d 141 (La. App. 1950).
74. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554, 35 Sup. Ct.
289, 59 L. Ed. 713 (1915).
75. 250 S.W.2d 537 (1952).
76. BANKRUPTcy ACT § 17, 52 STAT. 851 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35
(1953).
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the proceedings in bankruptcy, or, in the absence of such proper and
timely scheduling, that the creditor "had notice or actual knowledge
of the proceedings in bankruptcy."
77
In the present case, after the discharge, bankrupt was sued on a
debt which arose before his bankruptcy. When he interposed the
discharge as a defense, claimant took the position that the debt was
not released on the ground that it had not been duly scheduled and
that claimant had no notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Claimant's name was W. G. Ingram, the debt was scheduled
under the name of L. E. Ingram, it was stipulated that notice was
mailed to L. E. Ingram, and claimant denied receipt of notice. It was
stipulated also that a witness would swear that, about a week before
the bankruptcy, bankrupt told a truck driver of claimant about the
pending bankruptcy. Claimant denied receipt of this information.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision that the debt
was not released for the reason that it was not duly scheduled and
that claimant had no notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings prior to the discharge. The case may be correctly decided, but
some of the reasoning of the Court is disturbing.
While only "duly scheduled" debts are discharged (unless the credi-
tor had notice or knowledge), what is and what is not due scheduling
must depend largely upon the facts of each case.78 In order that a
debt be duly scheduled, the name of the creditor must be included in
the schedule; just what constitutes satisfactory performance of this
requirement, again, is dependent upon the facts of the particular
case.79 Thus, while exactness is necessary in scheduling the creditor
by name, in some instances a misnomer may not be fatal because of
the principle of idem sonans.80 However, a misnomer may be fatal to
proper scheduling if the name is not of idem sonans.8 1 Therefore, in
the present case, the Court probably was correct in deciding that
scheduling W. G. Ingram as L. E. Ingram, was not "due scheduling"
and that the claim was not affected by the bankruptcy discharge. That
is, the debt would not be released unless the creditor had notice or
knowledge of the claim,82 and that, in turn, depended upon whether
77. 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3560 (5th ed. 1939, Supp. 1952); In re Seigel,
43 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Ga. 1942); Levine v. Katz, 293 Mich. 493, 292 N.W. 466.
(1940).
78. 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3561 (5th ed. 1939).
79. 1 COLLIR, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed. 1940).
80. 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3561 (5th ed. 1939)-.
81. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed. 1940); 7 REMINGTON, BANK-
RUPTCY, §§ 3561, 3562 (5th ed. 1939). Louis Cohen instead of Max Cohen is not
"due scheduling." See Cohen v. Pinkus, 126 App. Div. 792, 111 N.Y. Supp. 82
(1st Dep't 1908). Likewise, William J. Davidson's debt was not discharged
when he was scheduled as William F. Davidson. Collins v. Davidson, 34 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 668 (1908).




the notice given the truck driver of the creditor would be imputed to
the creditor.
Knowledge of an employee of the creditor may be knowledge of the
creditor where the employee was an agent authorizd to receive such
notice for his principal, 3 but such knowledge will not be imputed
where it has not been shown that the employee who received the
notice was authorized to receive notice for his principal.84 Since the
one who attempts to bind a principal with notice through an agent has
the burden of proving that the putative agent was authorized to
receive such notice, the Court probably was correct in holding that a
mere stipulation that the bankrupt had given notice to a "truck driver"
of the creditor, without more, was not enough proof that the truck
driver was an agent with authority to receive such information for
the creditor. Thus, the Court was on firm ground in holding that the
creditor had no timely notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings so as to discharge the debt.
The most disturbing aspect of the case, however, is the Court's
interpretation of clause (3) of section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. The
caption of that section is "Debts Not Affected by A Discharge." Clause
(3) provides that debts are not released where they "have not been
duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of
the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice
or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy...." (emphasis
supplied) 85 The bankrupt had contended that the phrase, "if known to
the bankrupt," relieved the bankrupt of doing more than scheduling
the name of the creditor as he knew it. He had stated his position in
his brief in the following proposition; "Of course, in no event is the
bankrupt obligated to insert the correct name of the creditor in the
schedule if the name is unknown to him." The Court rejected this
contention of the bankrupt as novel and concluded that the phrase
"if known to the bankrupt" modified and referred to the caption of
section 17, which reads "Debts Not Affected by A Discharge," rather
than modify and refer to the phrase "with the name of the creditor."
The Court concluded that it would do no violence to section 17 if the
phrase "with the name of the creditor" and the phrase "if known to
the bankrupt" were inverted and section 17, clause (3), be made to
read that debts are not affected by a discharge which "have not been
duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance ... if known to the
83. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed. 1940).
84. Collins & Toole v. Crews, 3 Ga. App. 238, 59 S.E. 727 (1907) (notice to
agent who sold goods not sufficient); Continental Purchasing Co. v. Norelli, 133
N.J.L. 550, 45 A.2d 310, aff'd, 48 A.2d 816 (1946) (notice to attorney who repre-
sented creditor at time judgment was entered but by not at time of bankruptcy
proceedings did not charge creditor with notice sufficient to discharge claim);
see Gilmore v. Farmer, 156 IM. App. 70 (1910).
85. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 17, 52 STAT. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (1952).
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bankrupt,... with the name of the creditor, unless such creditor had
notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy." (empha-
sis by Court) 86
In adopting the tortured view that the phrase "if known to the bank-
rupt" modifies the caption of section 17, "Debts Not Affected by A Dis-
charge," rather than modifying the "name of the creditor," the Court
seems to stand alone. In fact, the contention of the bankrupt - rejected
by the Court as novel and unsupported by authority- that, "[o]f
course, in no event is the bankrupt obligated to insert the correct name
of the creditor in the schedule if the name is unknown to him," states
the law exactly as it is stated in the authoritative work, Collier on
Bankruptcy.87 Another great work, Remington on Bankruptcy, like-
wise disagrees with the Tennessee Court and gives clear and un-
equivocal support to the bankrupt's position in these words: "It is not
necessary that the name of the creditor be shown if it is not known, as
is likely to be the case with negotiable paper in the hands of in-
dorsers. '' 88 All the cases found are to the same effect- namely, that
in order for the bankrupt to obtain a discharge it is not imperative that
he schedule the creditor's name, if the bankrupt does not know the
name of the creditor.89
As has already been suggested, the rule that does not require the
bankrupt to schedule the name of his creditor, if not known to the
bankrupt, has its principal application where, unknown to the bank-
rupt, the debt has been transferred to another party.90 There, he may
schedule the claim in the name of the original debtor with impunity,
since the bankrupt ordinarily is under no duty to ascertain inde-
pendently whether any other parties have obtained an interest in
the claim.91 However, a debt scheduled under the name of the original
creditor is not dischargeable if the bankrupt knew or ought to have
known that the debt had been transferred and could have scheduled
the debt in the name of the present owner.
92
86. 250 S.W.2d at 538.
87. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed. 1940).
88. 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 3561 (5th ed. 1939).
89. Representative of this position is the following: "The Bankruptcy Act
does not require the impossible, but provides for the listing of the names of
creditors 'if known to the bankrupt' and not otherwise. Failure to state the
names of unknown creditors does not impair the efficacy of the discharge."
Levin v. Katz, 293 Mich. 493, 292 N.W. 466, 468 (1940), quoting for Broderick v.
Adamson, 240 App. Div. 229, 268 N.Y. Supp. 766, 769 (1st Dep't 1934). Many
other cases take the same position. E.g., Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U.S. 21, 35
Sup. Ct. 685, 59 L. Ed. 1185 (1915); Cleveland v. Summerfield, 194 Ark. 727,
109 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1937); Hunter v. Hall, 60 Ga. App. 493, 4 S.E.2d 69, 70
(1939).
90. E.g., New Netherlands Bank of New York v. Harris & Cohen, 233 Ill. App.
378 (1924); Levin v. Katz, 293 Mich. 493, 292 N.W. 466 (1940); 7 REMGTON,
BANKRUPTCY § 3561 (5th ed. 1939).
91. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed. 1940).
92. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.23 (14th ed. 1940, Supp. 1952).
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